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ABSTRACT
Auction is a mechanism of selling distinct assets that can be both physical objects and
virtual objects. Examples of virtual objects are the rights to use assets like airport time
slots and FCC spectrum, or to service truckload delivery routes in a transportation
network. Under some situations bidding on combinations of objects can render lower
total price compare with bidding the objects one at a time, and the auction that allows
bidders to bid on combinations of different assets are called combinatorial auctions.
With shipper being the auctioneer and carriers being the bidders, combinatorial
auction has become increasingly important in the transportation service procurement
domain, due to its mechanism to align shipper procurement interest with carrier
transportation service cost structure, which in turn lowers shipper total procurement
cost.
The thesis provides a comprehensive review of the use of conditional bidding within
a transportation combinatorial auction framework. The thesis first describes the
general forms of the transportation services available, and discusses the economics of
motor carriers that provide LTL and TL services. It then illustrates the basic
optimization technique of conditional bidding for TL service procurement and
discusses the information technologies that enable the optimization-based
procurement and the actual application of the method in the real world.
Thesis Supervisor: Masters, James M
Title: Executive Director, MLOG Program
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1. Introduction
This chapter describes the general classification of transportation systems. The section
explains the direct and consolidated operation, gives background in the motor carrier industry, and
discusses the economics of TL and LTL services. The chapter serves as the fundamental
knowledge base of the thesis discussion of the TL service procurement best practice.
1.1 The Classification of Transportation Systems
Transportation Systems can first be classified by carrier transportation mode. Generally
speaking there are following transportation modes: Rail, Motor, Ocean, Air, Parcel, Pipeline,
Barge. The operation of each type of transportation mode, especially for Rail, Motor, Ocean, Air,
and Parcel types of services that are most commonly used, can be further classified by the type and
degree of consolidation. Consolidation is the process of combining different items or shipments
into loads on a single vehicle. The extent of consolidation performed is a prime determinant of how
the system makes trade-offs between levels of service and cost [1].
Three types of consolidation have been most commonly observed: time consolidation,
vehicle consolidation and terminal consolidation:
o Time consolidation: is where a shipper (or carrier) holds items at a location until a sufficient
volume is accumulated before arranging for movement. The items do not necessarily need to
have the same destination. A typical example would be an office arranging for a single pickup
of mail at the close of each business day.
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L Vehicle consolidation: is where a single vehicle makes multiple stops to pickup (or deliver)
shipments from shippers that have the same destination (or origin). The multiple shipments are
combined into a single load in the vehicle. A typical example would be the postal service and
mail carriers (FedEx, UPS, etc.) that perform regularly scheduled pickup and delivery runs.
o Terminal consolidation: is where shipments from multiple origins are sent to a common
facility where they are unloaded, sorted, and reloaded into vehicles heading to common
destinations. A shipment may be routed through multiple terminals in its path to its final
destination. A typical example would be the Hub and Spoke system used in the passenger
airline operations.
A transportation system could use one type of consolidation, or use combination of
consolidation types, depending on the trade-offs involved with consolidation decisions between
unit costs and delivery time. All three types of consolidation lowers unit cost though the spread out
of the fixed cost of the shipment movement, but Time consolidation increases the transit time by
delaying the departure for a portion of the items; Vehicle consolidation involves additional travel
time due to circuitous routing; and Terminal consolidation results in additional time and cost
involved in handling, sorting, and circuitous travel to route items through terminals, and requires
substantial investment in facilities that can only be justified by sufficiently high volumes.
The degree of consolidation, in the other hand, depends on the critical factors like shipment
size and level of service. The smaller the size of the shipment is, the more consolidation is required
to achieve lane density justifiable to the cost of movement. Higher level of service requirement like
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tighter transit time would restrict consolidation opportunities and can lead to direct shipment
operation. In the next section, we illustrate the difference between the direct and consolidated
operations.
1.2 The Direct versus Consolidated Transportation Operations
A classic example of consolidated and direct operation is buses/subways and taxis.
Busses/subways is a consolidated transportation system, operate according to a schedule over
predefined and regular routes that rely upon all three types of consolidation: Passengers must wait
at the stops until a scheduled pickup has arrived (time consolidation). Busses/subways performs
vehicle consolidation along the predefmed routes for picking and drop off of passengers.
Busses/subways transport passengers to terminals where passengers sort themselves to exit the
system or get on other vehicles that head for different locations. In a consolidated system, items
spend more time in the system in exchange of the lower unit cost.
On the other hand, taxis provides in time and flexible service for the passengers. The taxi
goes to a person's destination directly, and no vehicle or terminal consolidation is involved
between the origin and destination. The passenger pays higher cost in exchange of faster transit
time or possibly better service in reliability and access.
With similar principle, in the Rail transportation mode, distinction is made between CL (Car
Load) and LCL (Less than Car Load). In the Motor carrier transportation mode, distinction is made
between TL (Truck Load) and LTL (Less than Truck Load). The following figure illustrates the
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transportation system modal alternatives distinguished between direct and consolidated shipment
operation:
Operation
Direct
CL (Car
Load)
TL (Truck
Load)
Charter
Charter
Courier
Consolidated
LCL (Less than Car
Load)
LTL (Less than Truck
Load)
Scheduled
Scheduled
UPS/FDX
Figure 1.2. Direct versus Consolidated Transportation Operation
1.3 The Motor Carrier Industry --- TL and LTL
The thesis focuses on the procurement of TL services of Motor
The next sections provide background of the Motor carrier industry,
and LTL services, and the economies of each operation.
carrier transportation mode.
the distinction between TL
1.3.1 Motor Carrier Industry Market Overview
By 1998, with some $344 billion in 1998 revenues, the motor carrier business claimed 79%
of the U.S. commercial freight transportation market. This total was divided between two sectors:
private carriage and for hire. The following table breaks down the segment by operations:
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Rail
Motor
Ocean
Air
Parcel
Transportation Billion $ %ofTotal
Private, Interstate $115 21.3%
Private, Local $85 15.7%
Truckload (TL) $65 12.0%
Local For-Hire $40 7.4%
LTL, National $9 1.7%
F . .LTL, Regional $11 2.0%
Package/Express (ground) $19 3.5%
Trucking,, Total $34 636
Rai road F $36 6.7%
Pipeline (oil and gas) $26 4.8%
Air Freight Pac kage Do mestic $17 3.1%
Air Freight, Heavy Domestic $6 1.1%
Water (Great Lakes/rivers) $7 1.3%
Transportation Total* $436 80.6%
Logistics Administration $35 6.5%
Distribution Total $105 19.4%
Total* $541 100.0%
*Excluding $ 5 billion in international cargo.
Sources: Standard & Poor's, Data Resources, Inc., and Cass Information Systems.
Figure 1.3.1. Commercial Freight Distribution in 1998
It is estimated that the total Motor carrier activity exceeds $450 billion annually in the United
States in following years [2]. There are approximately 83,000 truck fleets in the country. These
fleets represent private fleets and those available for hire. About $260 B is accounted for private
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fleets, with the rest of the $190 B account for the for-hire carriers regulated by the Department of
Transportation. A for-hire carrier is a company whose primary business is the transportation of
goods for other companies for a fee. These regulated carrier number over 60,000. The top 100
carriers control about 50% of this sector. Market segment of the for-hire motor carrier industry are
generally identified by the following types of service:
i Small package services: This is the smallest segment of the trucking industry and is
dominated by United Parcel Service and Federal Express. By 1997, the segment stands for
about $38 B revenues led by Airborne Express, Federal Express, UPS and US Postal Service
[2].
o Less-than-truckload, general freight (LTL): LTL carriers consolidate and haul multiple
shipments in one vehicle and operate a regular route system connecting local, breakbulk, and
relay terminals. This segment generally involves shipments of less than 10,000 pounds. At least
75% of LTL revenues are obtained from interstate traffic.
o Truckload (TL): The truckload segment hauls full loads of general or specialized
commodities over irregular routes from shipper's dock to consignee's location typically
without passing through carrier terminals to consolidate or sort freight. Truckload shipments
include a variety of general bulk freight, household goods, automobile transport, and chemical
tanks. Less than 75% of TL traffic is derived from interstate commerce. The overall market
size is estimated at well over $60 billion (about 200 carriers). TL segment is comprised of
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General Freight and Specialized Service. With General Freight stands for about one third of the
TL revenue.
The LTL and TL segments are extremely fragmented. The largest players in these markets
are national in scope and have a presence in several market niches. There are thousands of regional
trucking companies, many of which serve specialized niches. The major distinctions between the
LTL and TL are average output, average load size, shipment size, and length of haul. TL carriers
have lower average output, but higher average loads, shipment size, and average length of haul
than LTL services.
1.3.2 The Economics of TL and LTL Carriers
In this thesis, we focus on the transportation services provided by the for-hire carriers,
specifically, the TL service. To do that, we first need to examine the economics of shipper and
carrier as a buyer-vendor relationship. For a shipper to procure transportation service from a
carrier, the shipper tries to reduce freight rates through best matching of carrier's cost structure.
The cost function for carrier can be represented by C(X1, X2, ... Xi), where Xi is the number of
shipments on lane i. Consider the following simple example with two lanes:
Lane 1
A 
BD
CD'1_ .Lane 2
Figure 1.3.2. Example Transportation Network
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L Economies of Scale: Economies of Scale are present if the unit costs for serving over a
network decrease if the volume on all of the lanes increases in the same proportion. Using A as
the scale parameter, in the example network, if there is economy of scale, we would have:
C()X 1,5X 2) < AC(XIX 2)
Assume the monthly flow on the network is 100 shipments for lane 1, 10 shipments for lane 2.
One TL carrier is assigned 50% on each lane --- 50 shipments for lane 1, and 5 shipments for
lane 2. If economy of scale exists for TL, it would mean assigning 100% of the traffic instead
of 50% would lower the unit transportation cost for the carrier. However, since TL carriers
have very low fixed costs, and are more sensitive to the balance of loads, they tend to have
slight diseconomies of scale if the network is very imbalanced. We will explain why TL
carriers are more sensitive to balance of loads in the next section.
o Economies of Scope: Economies of Scope are present if the total cost of a single carrier
serving a set of lanes is lower than the cost would be if multiple carriers served these lanes.
Using the example network, if there is economy of scope, it can be represented by the
following formula:
CA (X1 , X 2 ) < CA (XI ,0) + CB (0, X 2 )
For the two carriers A and B, if economy of scope exists, it means using one carrier for both
lanes is more cost effective than using one carrier for each lane. TL carriers exhibit significant
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economies of scope, because the cost of serving an origin-destination pair is heavily affected
by the probability of finding a follow-on load out of that destination location.
o Economies of Density: In addition to economies of scale and scope, a carrier's cost can also
be influenced by density of shipments. Economies of density are present if increasing either the
customer density or the number of shipments per customer location, while holding the total
number of shipments constant, results in the reduction of unit delivery costs. This means the
consolidation of shipments would result in lower unit cost. This economy applies primarily to
consolidated carriers (the LTL services), and little on the TL service.
In general, we conclude that TL carriers exhibit strong economies of scope, and LTL carriers
exhibit significant economies of density. The procurement strategy with the goal of lowering
delivery cost thus can arise from this important observation and will be illustrated in the next
chapter.
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2. Truckload Procurement
This chapter first illustrates the truckload operation at the line haul level. Through the
breakdown of a line haul operation, the non-value added activities are exposed. The objective of
optimizing the TL service procurement is about reducing/eliminating the non-value added
activities, especially the cost of reposition activity. The chapter then discusses the common
procurement model for the Truckload industry, with the purpose of identifying the necessity of a
procurement bidding best practice. The chapter finally defines the scope of the thesis discussion.
2.1 Truckload Operation Activities
As mentioned previously, Truckload (TL) carriers operate like taxis, performing direct line-
hauls from origin to destination. The following figure shows the chain of activities associated with
the connection between two loads in a time-space diagram [I].
- o* Loaded
L
o A--- Empty
C
A
T
I N 11
0 C - _- -
N
Line- Wait in Unload Re- Wait in t Line- Time
Haul Queue position Queue oad Haul
Fi2ure 2.1. Connection activities between line-hauls
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In the diagram, the vertical axis represents locations or nodes in the transportation network.
We take an example of three locations: A, B and C. The horizontal axis is the time dimension, with
each period of time marked with the corresponding activity. The solid arrow lines represent loaded
movement that is usually paid activities. The dotted arrow lines represent deadhead, waits or other
unpaid activities. Between two line-hauls, the unpaid (non-value added) activities that occupy
equipment, resource and staff are usually unloading, reposition and Queue waiting. There are
obvious reasons for the TL carriers to want to minimize or eliminate the unpaid activities. The
same incentive goes to the Shipper: by corresponding better to the carrier's cost structure and
reducing the uncertainty and waste for the carrier, the carrier can offer same service at lower rate.
Among the three general unprofitable activities, the reduction of reposition activity is the one we
focus on.
2.2 The General TL Procurement Process
In practice, most shippers follow a general five-step procedure to procure transportation
services [1] in the sequence of strategic, tactical and operational procedures illustrated in Figure 3.
Step 1. Carrier Screening: The procurement process begins with the strategic decision of
selecting the carrier base. Shipper usually uses some sort of screening process to reduce the
number of potential carriers to a reasonable subset. The most common screening criteria are
financial stability, geographic coverage, electronic data interchange (EDI) capability, and
equipment availability. The purpose of carrier screening is to reduce the complexity and cost of the
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final selection process, by filtering the thousands of candidate carriers down to hundreds or dozens
of quality guaranteed carriers.
Fi2ure 2.2. Transportation Procurement Model
Step 2. Information Exchange: After the set of potential carrier candidates has been
selected, the shipper now provides shipment network details to the carriers, for example, the daily
records of historical freight volume and movement. The carriers use this information to develop
bids for the procurement services and volume commitments. The quality of the information and the
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Stra tegic Step 1. Carrier Screening
Tactical
----Step 2. Information Exchange
Step 3. Carrier Assignment
------------------------
Operational
Step 4. Load Tendering
Step 5. Performance Review
format of the information that shippers communicate with the carriers are critical for the overall
optimization of the procurement practice.
Step 3. Carrier Assignment: Once the shipper's transportation requirement has been shared
with the carriers, depending on the bidding information the carriers submit, the shipper selects the
final set of carriers that would best suit the procurement needs in terms of lowest cost. The shipper
assigns carriers to the shipment network for each traffic lane. This is a lane-by-lane assignment that
is performed either by a contract forming competitive bidding process or in the spot market. The
contracts formed in this step are usually open agreements between shipper and carriers, as
modification is usually allowed, and the load tendering carrier being picked for a lane at the time
when the shipment is finally ready to be shipped. Step 2 and Step 3 are iterative and coupled as the
tactical phase of the procurement process.
Step 4. Load Tendering: Although carriers have been assigned to each lane during the
Carrier Assignment step, due to real time uncertainty, final choices need to be made for selecting
exactly which carrier to use for each load as it becomes ready to ship. In other words, while the
assignment process provides some guidelines as to which carrier to call for certain lanes, there is
often need for real-time choices to be made between alternative carriers.
Step 5. Performance Review: The final step in the procurement process is review of each
carrier performance by tracking important Key Performance Indicator like carrier refusal rates, on-
time pickup/delivery rates, service standard, etc. This step provides feedback to the carrier
screening procedure, and suggests corrective actions for the carrier screening decisions. Step 4 and
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Step 5 are seen as the operational procedures. While important, they are outside the discussion of
the thesis.
2.3 Thesis Scope
While many researches have been focused on the strategic phase of understanding of
shipper's cost and service trade-off for identifying the criteria used for carrier selection, studies and
major development have been done in the tactical transportation procurement phase during the last
decade. This thesis focuses on the tactical steps of the procurement process: Information Exchange
and Carrier Assignment. While important, the operational procedures are outside the scope of the
thesis.
As mentioned before, the primary purpose for the Information Exchange and Carrier
Assignment procedure is to find and allocate the right carriers serving the right lanes under service
constraints with lowest possible cost. There are several ways that a shipper can perform the
allocation:
u Alternative one: the shipper randomly assigns carriers to lanes or use a lottery;
u Alternative two: the shipper uses an administrative process where a traffic manager or
transportation committee selects carriers based on direct negotiation;
o Alternative three: the shipper designs and conducts an auction to achieve efficient
allocations. The outcome is to award lanes to those bidders that value them the most, in
other words, assign traffic lanes to the carrier with the lowest cost structure for those lanes.
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Studies have shown that alternative three, the auctioning method, used with a well designed
approach, can generate much better results than the other two methods. Furthermore, using a
conditional bidding process during an auction can be particularly beneficial to both shippers and
carriers. This thesis thus discusses the conditional bidding practice that uses the optimization
methodology for TL service procurement.
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3. Combinatorial Auction in Transportation
As mentioned in the previous chapter, combinatorial auction framework can be used in the
tactical procurement steps of Information Exchange and Carrier Assignment to optimize the
service procurement cost. In this chapter, we discuss the mechanism of auction and the
mathematical implementation of conditional bidding for TL transportation procurement. Here
"shippers" are parties who have loads that need to be transported from origins to destinations and
hence are the "auctioneers" in the auction framework. "Carriers" are service providers and
"bidders". The items to bid are contracts to serve lanes with new loads, i.e. freight movement
between an origin-destination pair. A bid is a set of lanes with a bidding price.
3.1 Auction Fundamental
An auction is a method of valuation and allocation. It is essentially a price discovery process
that is most useful when the market value of an item is not established or is not suited for a single
fixed price [1]. Items being auctioned can be physical goods like rare art, government and bank
properties like houses, scare supplies like land, rights like spectrum licenses, etc. In transportation,
the auctioning and bidding of TL services is primarily an allocation problem in which the shipper
awards traffic lanes to carriers according to some mechanism.
An auction could be designed with different rules, and a slight change in rule could generate
very different results in the winning bids in terms of allocation and item valuations. This section
gives some basic explanations to the general forms of auctions that follow different rules.
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3.1.1 Types of Auction
There are four commonly discussed types of auctions: 1. English or ascending price auction,
2. Dutch or descending price auction, 3. First-price sealed-bid auctions and 4. Second-price sealed-
bid auctions. These types of auctions are known by different names, for example a Dutch auction is
also known as a falling clock auction and a second-price sealed-bid auction is also known as a
Vickrey auction.
In an English auction, bidders raise the price of a bid object until only one bidder is left. The
object is then sold at that final price. In a Dutch auction the price of a bid object starts at a high
level and is reduced by the auctioneer until one of the bidders declares that he is willing to pay that
price. In a first-price sealed-bid auction bids are presented in confidence to the auctioneer and the
winner is the highest bidder who then buys the bid object at his or her bid price. In a second-price
sealed-bid auction, the winner buys the bid object at the price of the second highest bid price.
3.1.2 Individual versus Combinatorial Object Types
An auction can present the auctioning objects item by item, or combine items into packages
each comprised of one or more items. Bidders submit bids against the individual objects, or the
packaged objects that is "combinatorial". Many modem auctions are "combinatorial" in nature,
meaning that a long list of items is offered for sale and bidders are free to submit bids on
packages of items from the list. A particular item then can (and often does) add much to the price
of one package, but little or nothing to the price of another. Combinatorial auctions are typically
broken into a succession of "rounds," during each of which participants are free to bid on any
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unsold package, and at the end of which the auctioneer must either accept or reject each of the
bids received. The process continues until a round occurs in which the auctioneer receives no
acceptable bids. [5]
3.2 Combinatorial Auction for Truckload Procurement Problem
One auction practice that has been used widely in the TL procurement problem is lane-by-
lane bidding and assignment, a sequential individual sealed-bid auction. During the Information
Exchange stage, the shippers give aggregated volume estimated by lane, origin, region or system,
based on historical record from previous year. Carriers then submit rates by lane in per mile or per
move basis. After the information has been exchanged, Carrier Assignment is performed through
Lane-by-lane analysis with low bid wins. Analysis is usually done using a spreadsheet, with no
advanced optimization method involved. As illustrated in chapter 1, TL carriers exhibit strong
economies of scope. The cost of serving a lane (an origin-destination pair) is heavily affected by
the probability of finding a follow-on load out of that destination location. Thus the value of a lane
cannot be truly discovered with a disconnected lane-by-lane auction practice.
Combinatorial auction in transportation, as the name implies, is the mechanism of combining
multiple items, in this case, multiple lanes, as one or more packages for bidding purpose.
Comparing to the lane-by-lane approach, optimum transportation procurement cost can be
achieved using combinatorial auctioning since the carriers can provide better estimated cost based
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on the probability of follow-on loads provided in the bidding packages which usually is lower than
the lane-by-lane bid price.
3.2.1 Conditional Bidding for Transportation Procurement
Within the combinatorial auction framework, one particular type of bid is conditional bids. A
conditional bid includes multiple lanes that are awarded as an all-or-nothing package. The bid price
is conditioned on the awarding of all of the lanes within the package, not just a portion of them.
The term "conditional" is used to distinguish from the normal combinatorial auction terms like
package bids, complex bids, or combination bids to emphasize the "all-or-nothing" criteria. It is
important to notice that just combining lanes together into one or several groups does not mean it is
a conditional bidding practice or combinatorial auctioning in transportation. For conditional bids,
the lane involved need to be offered in at least two separate packages so the shipper cannot a priori
determine to which package it should belong before the final optimized result is shown. If there is
no conflict over how to combine the lanes, then the lanes should simply be grouped and treated as
one lane using simple bids. A bid covering a lane is termed conditional since there are alternative
ways in which the lane can be combined with other lanes.
3.2.2 The Integer Optimization Based Solution
The conditional bidding as discussed above is actually an integer optimization problem, as it
is the decision about the shipper picking the carriers under the all-or-nothing constraint (and other
applicable constraints like volume and demand, etc) that would minimize the total bidding price
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submitted by various carriers. A simple example is given in this section to illustrate the bid
package construction and optimization resolution of the carrier assignment problem [18].
Consider a small network comprised of 3 locations: A, B, C, and 4 lanes (origin-destination
pair): A to B, B to C, C to B, and C to A. Nine possible packages (#1 to #9) can be constructed
with either one or more lanes for each package servable by a carrier. The network and packages
are illustrated in Figure 3.1. Two carriers are bidding for the rights to serve the 4 lanes and submit
bids for each of the packages a carrier is allowed to bid. In this simple case, assuming each of the
two carriers is allowed to bid for all 9 packages. The bidding price for each package from each
carrier is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Binary values "1" for each lane has been given corresponding to
each package indicating whether the lane is included in the package.
The Network: Possible Pack2ges:
#24
#6
#3
0#
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Figure 3.2.2.1 Network Example with Nine Bid Packages
#9
The objective of the carrier assignment problem of this simple case thus can be defined as: Minimize
total cost of the bid price through picking one or more carriers, while satisfying the constraint of one
lane being served once and only once. Figure 3.2 shows an excel version of the optimization solution
for the case using Excel Solver:
+C
Bkmar Va 01ablec:
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Constraimts:
Cons. orA-*B: I
ConstforB-+C: 1
Const or C-+A:
ConsLor C-+B: I
Objective Fetio: *1,025
Figure 3.2.2.2. Bidding Packages and Bid Optimization Resolution
The decision variables are the Binary Variables of [0,1], indicating whether the bid of a
package from a carrier is picked for service. The Constraints ensures that each origin-destination
pair should only be included once when picking the carriers and packages. The Objective Function
is to minimize the total bidding price for selected packages and carriers. The general formula for
the optimization problem is illustrated as following:
Objective Function:
MinX I C X
P s
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Subject to:
1) JJ8SfXS =1 Vl; p e P;s e S;le L
P S
2) X E [0,1] pE PSE S
Where:
P: Bid package set; S: Carrier set; L: Lane set;
p : Bid package index (in the example, 1 to 9);
s : Carrier index (in the example, 1 to 2);
1: Lane index (in the example, 1 to 4);
6SP : Data input of binary indicator of [0,1], indicating whether lane 1 is included in
package p bid by carrier s ;
X' : Binary decision variable indicating whether carrier s is selected for package p.
3.3 Implementation Factors for Combinatorial Auction
As simple as it seems in the above example, combinatorial auctioning is much more difficult
to carry out in real life. One reason is because of the mathematical challenge of Integer
Optimization for large-scale problem. Another reason is because of the implementation factors
illustrated in this section.
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3.3.1 Additional Constraints
On top of the integer and all-or-nothing constraints illustrated in the example, in real
implementations of combinatorial auction for carrier assignment, usually the following additional
constraints have to be included: demand for each lane, total number of carriers in the system,
maximum number of carriers allowed for each location, etc. A general form of the optimization
problem can thus be illustrated as following to embrace the additional constraints:
Objective Function:
Mini I C X
PS
Subject to:
EE&P X =1
P s
( EaX >D,
P S
YE jJsPxs >KD
P S
P s
Xs E= [0,I]
Vi; pe P;se S;le L
Vi; peP;seS;le L
pe P;se S
Vi ; pe P;se S;ie I
p EP;se S
Where:
P : Bid package set; S : Carrier set; L : Lane set; I: Location set;
p : Bid package index (in the example, 1 to 9);
s: Carrier index (in the example, 1 to 2);
1: Lane index (in the example, 1 to 4);
27
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
i: Location index (in the example, I to 3);
X' : Binary decision variable indicating whether carrier s is selected for package p.
3S' : Data input of binary indicator of [0,1] indicating whether lane 1 is included in
package p bid by carrier s ;
i' : Data input of binary indicator of [0,1] indicating whether carrier s has a lane
originating from location i to serve package p ;
K: Total number of carriers allowed for the system;
K1 : Maximum number of carriers allowed for an originating location i;
3.3.2 Fixed Cost Considerations
The above formulation considers only the bidding price for each package by carriers, yet in
real life fixed cost and other variable cost are usually encountered when adding a carrier to serve a
certain location. If the situation is too important to be ignored, the additional cost should be
included in the objective function. An example of the modified objective function is shown as
below:
Min(JECsX +Y yfsy.+I Fs)
p s S i S
where fs is the fixed cost of adding carrier s to serve location i; y, is the number of
carriers serving location i; Fs is the fixed cost of adding carrier s to the system. Corresponding
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modifications should also be made for the constraints to include the additional variables and
relationships.
3.3.3 Additional Lanes versus All Lanes
Due to the economy of scope and density character of TL transportation procurement, the
relationship between bid rates, lanes and volumes is usually not linear and is much more difficult
to evaluate in real life. In addition, shippers sometimes just want to put out additional lanes to bid
while a set of carriers serve the existing lanes. The carriers bidding for the new lanes might not
have the right or opportunity to bid for the most cost effective package thus posing additional
constraint to the optimization framework. Adjustment in this situation calls for better lane
packaging and carrier selection in order to achieve effective allocation and value discovery.
3.3.4 Complexity of Auction Design
Despite the uncertainties in cost structure and business requirement, auction has its inherent
complexity in implementation for both carriers and shippers, comparing to the traditional RFQ
method. A traditional RFQ method is the way shippers acquire transportation service by sending
out Request for Quote to the carriers, then negotiate with the carriers to establish contracts. A
combinatorial auction approach, in particular, has five main complexities:
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3.3.4.1 Bid Package Construction
The first complexity is the use of a large number of potential packages and the need for the
carriers to be able to price each of the combinations. The shipper must solve the set partitioning
problem during the auction design process to decide the bid package structure that fundamentally
scopes the economics of the optimization problem. The bid package structure here refers to how
the different lanes are grouped into packages. One rule of thumb for designing the bid package
structure of TL bidding problem is to match inbound and outbound traffic lanes so the bid
packages will generally, but not always, consist of adjacent lanes in a tour. The packages that
represent closed tours (a combination of lanes together which begin and end at the same location),
for example, will most likely not contain more than four or five lanes since it becomes
unmanageable to control in real-time tendering. The process of designing the bid packages
involves load requirement identification, network construction, lane matching, efficient
aggregation of lanes and bid package design. Algorithms and methodologies for each of the
procedures for this bid package design process can be found in the "Pre-Bid Network Analysis"
section in Caplice's Ph.D thesis [1].
3.3.4.2 Carrier Pricing
Another complexity is the need for carrier to price the various (and usually numerous)
packages and submit bids. In one hand, different bid package offerings can result in different prices
for serving the lanes; on the other hand, it is usually difficult for the carriers to estimate the true
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reservation value of a package even when the packages are well presented. The reason for this
difficulty lies in the lack of historical information, uncertainty of business process for reaching a
contract, and low level of communication between shippers and carriers. Depending on how the
auction is carried out, for example, single round or multiple round, simultaneous or sequential,
negotiation after winner picking, competition information availability, etc., carriers for risk averse
reasons and profit considerations can over estimate the biding price and hide the fair value even if
they have the ability to estimate the real reservation value. In addition, the carriers might be
required to submit prices multiple times for various packages in a short time period that may be
difficult to achieve without sophisticated pricing technology.
3.3.4.3 Mathematical Formulation
As a complicated Integer Optimization problem, a concise and solvable mathematical model
representation is critical in real life implementation. While numerous, in general three typical
models have been proposed by previous studies: the WMG model, the carrier-set model and the
bid-set model. We hereafter give some brief explanations to the three formulations.
The WMG model (a model published by Moore, Warmke, and Gorban in 1991) is a mixed
integer program (MIP) model that minimizes freight costs (usually only single-move, flat rates) by
assigning carriers to specific shipping locations and traffic lanes and allocating traffic volumes.
The results of the MIP were then used in a simulation model of daily freight operations which took
into account service problems with the fluctuating shipping requirements and other considerations.
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The simulation is to make the final decisions on the number of carriers, core carrier selection,
carrier assignment to shipping locations, fixed and variable commitments, expected shipping
volumes and commitments, and estimated costs and savings. The WMG model, however, fails to
capture economies of scope inherent in the TL procurement problem. A Carrier-Set formulation is
presented by Caprice in 1996 that treats the entire allocation of lanes and traffic volume to a carrier
as a single decision variable. The model considers a carrier's economics as a whole that allows the
inclusion of various volume discount pricing strategies while maintaining a linear IP. The
formulation is designed to be solved using column generation. A lane-based, bid-set model has
also been proposed by Caprice that captures economies of scope.
3.4.4.4 Winner Selection
Combinatorial Auctions typically are administered in a multi-round auction format where
pre-qualified carriers are allowed to compete with one another and refine their bid responses to
target the portions of the shipper's network that they value the most. It also seems straightforward
to select the winners by solving the Integer Program once formulated and data have been given.
But usually the scale of the problem is very large in a real life scenario, so that some heuristic
method is needed to solve the program in the time required regardless of how advanced the
hardware and software is. Depending on the tactics of auction design and solution, the final
winners coming out of the system may be different and may incur different economy.
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3.4.4.5 Price Determination
The final auction price are based on the bidding prices that the carrier submitted, thus
shippers are concerned about the carrier's reservation values that the submitted bids are based
upon. The carrier's reservation value of a bid is defined as the lowest bid that the carrier is
prepared to make to acquire that lane from a shipper, given the current information. As mentioned
before, the reservation value depends on the network character, operational constraints,
competitive forces among the carriers and shippers, information availability and the capability of
determining the values accurately and timely.
On the other hand, bidding price is not the only cost that incurs to the procurement. Other
costs like auction implementation cost and carrier shift cost also influences the actual price of the
service procurement. In addition, even when the winning bids have been picked, depending on the
auction rule of the first price or second price, single or multiple round, sealed or open, the final
price settled for the contracts can be different. It is important to take account of the auction rules
and cost factors other than the package bids to come to the fair final price for the winning carriers.
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4. Applications of TL Combinatorial Auction
TL combinatorial auctioning has remained a theory until the advancement of software and
hardware technology that has enabled the process and the benefits to be demonstrated. In this
section, we give some discussion as to how the industries have been accommodating the advanced
combinatorial auction process and what technology providers are available to facilitate the efforts.
4.1 Real Applications and Benefits
In the last several years, many large companies that have heavy needs for transportation
procurement have been experimenting with sophisticated technology enabled combinatorial
auctioning in replacement of the traditional manual simple bidding process or RFQ-negotiation
process. Leading examples can be seen in Sears, Home Depot, W-Mart, etc. We hereby pick Home
Depot and Sears as two pioneer example to illustrate the real life application of combinatorial
auctioning.
Up until mid 90's, Home Depot's transportation bidding process was completely manual.
Home Depot would provide the carriers with origin and destination zip codes for the locations in
its network, and aggregate demand forecasts (expected number of annual moves) for each origin-
destination pair (referred to as a lane). Carriers did not, however, have information on Home
Depot's demand or growth patterns. Based on this sparse and aggregate information, carriers
would bid on each origin-destination pair separately. In an effort to improve the efficiency of the
bidding process, in 1996, Home Depot semi-computerized the bidding process by asking the
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carriers to submit bids on a standardized Excel spreadsheet on a diskette. Nevertheless, Home
Depot continued to procure bids for lanes on an individual basis and limit the information that was
provided to the carrier regarding the flow of orders on a lane. To achieve higher efficiency and
effectiveness in transportation services, Home Depot partnered with i2 Technologies, Inc. to
develop a flexible bidding mechanism for truckload shipments. The new bidding process provides
detailed information to the carriers about Home Depot's network and demand, and allows carriers
to bid for combinations of lanes, as well as for individual lanes. This helps carriers to better
analyze the impact of certain bidding alternatives on their own network, and to achieve synergies,
for example, by creating "continuous" moves which don't require empty travel between the lanes.
Furthermore, the new bidding mechanism is Internet-based, which allows carriers to create and
submit their bids electronically via a standard format. The first successful application of this new
bidding process was completed in January 2000 [8].
Another example, Sears, Roebuck and Co. is one of the largest procurers of trucking services
in the world through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Sears Logistics Services (SLS). SLS controls
supply chain elements that originate at the vendor (manufacturer) through distribution centers to
retail stores, and from vendor to distribution centers to cross dock facilities. In the early 90's, SLS
sought to lower its truckload carrier costs by consolidating trucking service acquisition to allow
truckload carriers to better deploy their assets and share the savings with SLS. SLS had contracted
the consulting firm of Jos. Swanson & Co. (JS&Co) to advise how to implement the desired
consolidation of trucking. JS&Co identified as promising the combined value trading technology
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being developed within the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) by the founders of Net
Exchange (NEX). SLS, JS&Co, and NEX formed a team to implement the desired consolidation
using combined value auctions. The initial auction involved 854 lanes with a service cost of
approximately $190 million per year. The combined value sequential auction that was
implemented reduced this cost to $165 million per year, a 13% savings. [9]
4.2 Technology Providers
While many technology providers have emerged (or vanished) during the last few years,
Logistics.com and Schneider Logistics Inc. are two of the major technology providers in the
transportation combinatorial auction arena that demonstrated sophistication and good customer
service levels.
Logistics.com Inc. (acquired by Manhattan Associates in 2002) provides integrated logistics
planning and execution solutions for shippers and carriers. The OptiBid (Version 3 by June, 2003) is
the company's transportation e-procurement solution that allows trucking companies to bid on
bundles of lanes. The company claims that approximately 35 Fortune 500 shippers and third-party
logistics providers and 2000 carriers have used Logistics.com's OptiBid to enable the procurement of
over $7 billion in annual recurring freight services, resulting in over $480 million in savings.
Schneider Logistics Inc. has just released a collaborative transportation procurement product,
SUMIT CVATM, the combined value auction (CVA) process is intended to give shippers the ability
to develop strategic transportation solutions that simultaneously lower costs and improve service
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levels by leveraging their carriers' existing capacity and networks. Through a multi-round auction
format, SUMIT CVA enables pre-qualified carriers to view a shipper's transportation requirements
and identify and bid on packages of lanes that best optimize their assets. Carriers are able to enter
their rates, create packages and conditional bids, review specific service requirements of the
freight, and analyze bid results in a Microsoft Excel-based bid workbook. Schneider Logistics
integrated and customized the combinatorial trading framework from Net Exchange, which is a
provider of optimization solutions that comprise contracts. Net Exchange is formed by the
California Institute of Technology in May 1994, based on research in computational combinatorial
trading.
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5. Summary
Generally speaking, combinatorial auctions in transportation procurement can lead to higher
economic efficiency. Being an important task, the procurement of transportation services poses
great cost saving opportunities for shippers. The traditional way of procuring a commodity like TL
services with service constraints involves shippers seeking transportation services from outside
companies and typically putting out a request for quotes from a set of carriers. Contracts are then
signed based on negotiated service charges. This process is similar to a simple sealed-bid auction
in which each bidder submits a sealed bid for a single item. When shippers needed to procure
transportation services for a set of distinctive delivery routes (called lanes) with different origins
and destinations or delivery schedules, they would obtain quotes for each lane individually and
repeat the simple auction process for each lane, or they might negotiate for bundles of lanes with
one carrier at a time. In the last few years, software has been developed to allow shippers to make
all lanes available for bidding simultaneously and to allow carriers to simultaneously bid upon
combinations of individual lanes --- thus the application of the combinatorial auction, and the
application has been reported to result in significant cost savings for both shippers and carriers [6].
On the other hand, the practical combinatorial auctions are hard to implement and sometimes
may even have negative value due to the inherent complexity and technical difficulty in auction
design and conditional bidding. The true value creation of using the conditional bidding scheme to
secure transportation services thus needs to be carefully analyzed before making the decision.
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